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Abstract
Online social networking sites are experimenting with the following crowd-powered procedure to
reduce the spread of fake news and misinformation: whenever a user is exposed to a story through her
feed, she can flag the story as misinformation and, if the story receives enough flags, it is sent to a
trusted third party for fact checking. If this party identifies the story as misinformation, it is marked
as disputed. However, given the uncertain number of exposures, the high cost of fact checking, and the
trade-off between flags and exposures, the above mentioned procedure requires careful reasoning and
smart algorithms which, to the best of our knowledge, do not exist to date.
In this paper, we first introduce a flexible representation of the above procedure using the framework
of marked temporal point processes. Then, we develop a scalable online algorithm, Curb, to select which
stories to send for fact checking and when to do so to efficiently reduce the spread of misinformation
with provable guarantees. In doing so, we need to solve a novel stochastic optimal control problem
for stochastic differential equations with jumps, which is of independent interest. Experiments on two
real-world datasets gathered from Twitter and Weibo show that our algorithm may be able to effectively
reduce the spread of fake news and misinformation.
1 Introduction
In recent years, social media and online social networking sites have become a major disseminator of false
facts, urban legends, fake news, or, more generally, misinformation. In this context, there are growing concerns
that misinformation on these platforms has fueled the emergence of a post-truth society, where debate is
perniciously framed by the repeated assertion of talking points to which factual rebuttals by the media or
independent experts are ignored. For example, the post-truth label has been widely used to describe the
presidential campaign of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. elections1 and the Leave campaign in the 2016
Brexit referendum2, whose outcomes have been then called into question.
In an effort to curb the spread of misinformation, major online social networking sites, such as Facebook,
Twitter or Weibo, are (considering) resorting to the crowd3,4,5. In particular, they are experimenting with the
following procedure to reduce the spread of misinformation: whenever users are exposed to a story through
∗This work was done during Jooyeon Kim’s internship at the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems.
1https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/16/why-the-post-truth-political-era-might-be-around-for-a-while/
2https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/13/boris-johnson-donald-trump-post-truth-politician
3https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news-feed-fyi-addressing-hoaxes-and-fake-news/
4https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/29/twitter-is-looking-for-ways-to-let-users-flag-fake-news/
5http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2055179/how-chinas-highly-censored-wechat-and-weibo-fight-fake
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their feeds, they have a choice to flag the story as misinformation and, if the story receives enough flags, it is
directed to a coalition of independent organizations6, signatories of Poynter’s International Fact Checking
Code of Principles7, for fact checking. If the fact checking organizations identify a story as misinformation, it
gets flagged as disputed and may also appear lower in the users’ feeds, reducing the number of people who
are exposed to misinformation. In this context, online social networking sites are giving advice to its millions
of users on how to spot misinformation online8. However, the above mentioned procedure requires careful
reasoning and smart algorithms which, to the best of our knowledge, are nonexistent to date:
— Uncertain number of exposures: the spread of information over social networking sites is a stochastic
process, which may depend on, e.g., the information content, the users’ influence and the network structure.
Thus, the number of users exposed to different stories varies greatly and we need to consider probabilistic
exposure models to capture this uncertainty.
— Fact checking is costly: given the myriad of (fake) stories spreading in online social networking sites and
the observation that fact checking is a costly process, we can only expect (the reviewers from) the coalition of
independent organizations to fact check a small percentage of the set of stories spreading over time. Therefore,
it is necessary to decide which stories to fact check and when to do so.
— Flags vs exposures: the more users are exposed to a story before sending it for fact checking, the greater
the confidence a story may be misinformation, however, the higher the potential damage if it turns out to be
misinformation. Thus, we need to find the optimal trade-off between misinformation evidence, by means of
flagging data, and misinformation reduction, by means of preventing (unwarned) exposures to misinformation.
Our approach. To tackle the above challenges, we first introduce a novel representation of the above
procedure using the framework of marked temporal point processes [1]. Then, we find which stories to send
for fact checking by solving a novel stochastic optimal control problem for SDEs with jumps [17], which differs
from the nascent literature on stochastic optimal control of social and information systems [49, 43, 48, 42] in
two technical aspects:
I. The control signal is a multidimensional survival process (i.e., a terminating temporal point process),
which is defined by means of a set of conditional intensities (i.e., stories to fact check), while previous
work has considered nonterminating temporal point processes as control signals.
II. The SDEs with jumps depend on random variables (i.e., flags) whose distributions depend on a priori
unknown parameters (i.e., flagging probability, which depends on whether a story is fake or legitimate).
In this context, a posterior estimate of these parameters arises naturally in the formulation of the
optimal control problem. In contrast, previous work did not consider application scenarios where
posterior inference was required.
These technical aspects have implications beyond the problem of detecting and reducing misinformation since
they establish an unexplored connection between stochastic online optimal control, survival analysis and
Bayesian inference. Moreover, we find that the solution to the above optimal control problem is relatively
simple and intuitive: the optimal intensity of fact checking is proportional to a posterior estimate of the
rate of misinformation. As a consequence, we can develop a scalable online algorithm, Curb, to schedule
which stories to send for fact checking to efficiently reduce misinformation. Finally, we experiment on two
real-world datasets gathered from Twitter and Weibo and show that our algorithm is able to effectively reduce
the spread of misinformation and fake news. To facilitate research in this area, we release an open source
implementation of our algorithm at http://learning.mpi-sws.org/curb/.
6This coalition of organizations includes, among many others, Snopes (http://www.snopes.com),
FactCheck (http://www.factcheck.org) or Politifact (http://www.politifact.com).
7http://www.poynter.org/fact-checkers-code-of-principles/
8https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/technology/uk-election-facebook-fake-news.html
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1.1 Related work
The research areas most closely related to ours are on truth discovery and rumor detection. In terms of truth
discovery, most previous work discovers the truth by assessing the trustworthiness of the information sources
and they do so using link-based measures [4, 16, 7], information retrieval based measures [45], accuracy-based
measures [9, 10, 46, 20, 28], content-based measures [2, 52, 38, 44, 39, 15, 36], graphical models [33, 47, 50, 51],
or survival analysis [37, 27]. A recent line of work [23, 25, 32, 41] also considers scenarios in which the truth
may change over time. In terms of rumor detection, previous work has typically relied on textual, network
and temporal features to characterize and detect rumors [14, 34, 21, 26, 29, 30, 35]. However, our work differs
from previous work in several key aspects: (i) the crowd-powered fact checking procedure is, to the best of our
knowledge, novel; (ii) we both detect and reduce the spread of misinformation, in contrast, previous work has
focused on detection and has not designed interventional strategies considering the exposure dynamics; and,
(iii) we develop a principled online algorithm by solving a stochastic optimal control of SDEs with jumps,
which is able to adapt to changes in the rate of exposures and flags, while previous work has developed off-line
algorithms. Moreover, note that our methodology could be extended to leverage the above detection methods
to further refine the posterior estimate of the rate of misinformation.
Learning from the crowd has been widely used in many different areas, e.g., web security [6, 40], spam
detection [53, 5], phishing detection [31] and fake online account detection [13]. Moreover, using expert
knowledge, such as the one provided by fact checking organizations, has been used to improve the quality
and reliability of crowd learning procedures [24, 18]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the present work
is the first that leverages both the crowd and expert knowledge in the context of detecting and preventing
the spread of fake news and misinformation.
Finally, there has been a paucity of work on stochastic optimal control of SDEs with jumps [49, 43, 48, 42],
however, previous work has focused on steering social activity, has not considered survival processes as control
signals, and has not considered SDEs with jumps depending on random variables whose distributions depend
on unknown parameters.
2 Problem formulation
To reduce the spread of misinformation, we optimize the following fact checking procedure used by major
online social networking sites. Users can flag any story in their feed as misinformation and, if a story receives
enough flags, it is sent to a third party for fact checking. If the third-party identifies a story as misinformation,
it gets flagged as disputed and may also appear lower in the users’ feeds. In this procedure, since the
third-party fact checking is costly, we need to decide which stories to fact check and when to do so—decide
how many flags are enough. For ease of exposition, we assume that, if a story is sent for fact checking, the
story is instantaneously verified—it is instantly revealed whether the story is fake or genuine9.
In this section, we first leverage the framework of marked temporal point processes [1] to model the above
mentioned fact checking procedure, starting from the data representation the model uses, then define and
estimate the rate of misinformation, which we will use to decide what and when to fact check, and finally
state the fact checking scheduling problem.
2.1 Data representation
Given an online social networking site with a set of users U and a set of unverified stories S, we define two
types of user events: exogenous events, which correspond to the publication of stories by users on their own
initiative, and endogenous events, which correspond to the resharing and/or flagging of stories by users who
are exposed to them through their feeds, similarly as in previous work [11, 8].
9One could easily relax this assumption by modeling the delay between the time when a story is sent for fact checking and the time
when it is verified.
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Formally, we represent each exogenous event as a triplet
p := ( u
↑
user
, t
↑
time
,
story
↓
s ),
which means that user u ∈ U posted story s ∈ S at time t at her own initiative. Moreover, we denote the
history of exogenous events for each story s up to time t by Hps(t) =
⋃
i:ti<t
{pi | si = s}.
Similarly, we represent each endogenous event as a 5-tuple
e := ( u
↑
user
, t
↑
time
,
story
↓
s, r
↑
reshare
,
flag
↓
f ),
which means that user u ∈ U was exposed to story s ∈ S at time t and decided (not) to reshare it, r = 1
(r = 0), and/or (not) to flag it, f = 1 (f = 0). Then, we denote the history of endogenous events for story
s up to time t by Hes(t) =
⋃
i:ti<t
{ei | si = s}. Finally, we gather the history of exogenous and endogenous
events for story s up to time t by Hs(t) = Hps(t)
⋃Hes(t) and the overall history of exogenous and endogenous
events up to time t by H(t) = ⋃s∈S Hs(t).
2.2 Fact checking generative process
We represent the times of the exogenous and endogenous events within the social networking site using two
multidimensional counting processes, Np(t) and N e(t), in which the s-th dimension, Nps (t) and Nes (t), count
the number of exogenous and endogenous events for story s up to time t. Following the literature on temporal
point processes [1], we characterize these counting processes using their corresponding intensities, i.e.,
E[dNp(t)|H(t)] = λp(t)dt,
E[dN e(t)|H(t)] = λe(t)dt,
where dNp(t) and dN e(t) denote the number of exogenous and endogenous events in the window [t, t+ dt)
and λp(t) := [λps(t)]s∈S and λe(t) := [λes(t)]s∈S denote the vector of intensities associated to all stories. Every
time a user is exposed to a story s, the binary indicators r and f are sampled from two Bernoulli distributions,
P(r = 1) = rs and P(f = 1) = fs, where rs and fs are story specific parameters which may depend on many
complex factors, e.g., content, source.
Moreover, we represent the times when stories are sent to a trusted third-party for fact checking using a
multidimensional binary counting process,M(t), in which the s-th dimension, Ms(t), becomes one when story
s is sent for fact checking. Here, we characterize this process using a vector of intensities u(t) := [us(t)]s∈S
associated to all stories, i.e., E[dM(t)|H(t)] = u(t) (1−M(t))dt, where  denotes pairwise product and
the term (1 −M(t)) ensures each story is sent for fact checking only once. Whenever story s is sent for
fact checking, we assume it gets instantly verified—it gets revealed whether s is fake or genuine. Under this
characterization, deciding which stories to fact check and when to do so becomes a problem of finding the
vector of intensities u(t) of fact checking events.
2.3 Endogenous and exogenous intensities
Following previous work [11, 12, 49], we model exogenous events for each unverified story s ∈ S as:
λps(t) := hs(t)(1−Ms(t)), (1)
where hs(t) ≥ 0 is a time-varying (differentiable) function and (1−Ms(t)) ensures the intensity of endogenous
events becomes zero if the story is verified (i.e., fact checked). For endogenous events, we consider the
following form for the intensity functions:
λes(t) =
[ Reshares︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ t
0
rs(τ)g(t− τ)dNes (τ) +
Posts︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ t
0
g(t− τ)dNps (τ)
] Fact check︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−Ms(t)), (2)
4
where the first term, with rs(τ) ∼ Bernoulli(rs), models the exposures due to reshares of story s by the
previous users, the second term models the exposures due to previous posts of story s by users on their
own initiative (i.e., exogenous events). In the first two terms, gs(t) denotes an exponential triggering kernel,
g(t) := γ exp(−ωt)I(t ≥ 0), which models the decay of influence of previous reshares and posts over time. By
making the intensity dependent on the history of reshares and posts, it becomes a stochastic process by itself.
Given the above functional form for the intensity of endogenous events, the following alternative repre-
sentation based on stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with jumps, which can be derived using Ito’s
calculus [17], will be useful to design our algorithm:
Proposition 1 Let Nes (t) be a counting process with associated intensity λes(t), given by Eq. 2. The tuple
(Nes (t), λ
e
s(t)) is a doubly stochastic Markov process whose dynamics can be represented by the following SDE
with jumps:
dλes(t) = −ωλes(t)dt− λes(t)dMs(t) + γ [rs(t)dNes (t) + (1−M(t))dNps (t)] (3)
2.4 Estimated rate of misinformation
If one cannot send all stories for fact checking, ideally, one may like to send only fake stories and favor those
which, if not fact checked, would reach the greatest number of users. However, we cannot directly observe
whether a story is fake (that is why we send it for fact checking!) and we do not know the total number of
users who will be exposed to the story if not fact checked. Instead, for each story, we will leverage the users’
flags and exposures to compute a running estimate of the rate of misinformation due to that story. Then, we
will find the optimal fact checking intensities u(t) that minimize a nondecreasing function of the estimated
misinformation rates over time.
Given a story s ∈ S, the number of users Nfs (t) who flagged the story up to time t can be formally defined
as
Nfs (t) :=
∫ t
0
fs(τ)dN
e
s (τ),
where Nes (t) counts the number of users exposed to story s by time t, fs(τ) ∼ fs, and it readily follows that
dNfs (t) = fs(t)dN
e
s (t). Then, we can estimate the average number of users N¯ms (t) exposed to misinformation
by time t, conditioned on the number of exposed users and flags, as
N¯ms (t) := pm|s,f=1N
f
s (t) + pm|s,f=0(N
e
s (t)−Nfs (t)) = pm|f=1Nfs (t) + pm|f=0(Nes (t)−Nfs (t))
where we assume that the probability that a story is misinformation given that a user did or did not flag
it is equal for all stories, i.e., pm|s,f = pm|f , and one can estimate pm|f from historical flag and exposure
data about fact checked stories. Here, the probability pm|f characterizes how good the crowd is at spotting
misinformation10.
Next, we can compute the differential dN¯ms (t) as
dN¯ms (t) =
[
(pm|f=1 − pm|f=0)fs(t) + pm|f=0
]
dNes (t)
and define the rate of misinformation as
λms (t)dt = E[dN¯ms (t)] =
[
(pm|f=1 − pm|f=0)fs + pm|f=0
]
λes(t)dt. (4)
Unfortunately, the flagging probability fs may depend on many complex factors, e.g., content, source, and is
generally unknown. To overcome this challenge, we assume a Beta prior on fs, i.e., fs ∼ Beta(α, β), and
10One could consider different false positive and false negative rates per user and per story, e.g., using text analysis or domain
knowledge about the website that published the story. However, for simplicity, we leave such extensions for future work.
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compute instead a posterior estimate of the rate of misinformation, which leverages both the number of
exposures Nes (t) and flags Nfs (t) by time t, i.e.,
λˆms (t)dt = Efs(t),fs [dN¯
m
s (t)] =
[
(pm|f=1 − pm|f=0) α+N
f
s (t)
α+ β +Nes (t)
+ pm|f=0
]
λes(t)dt, (5)
where we used the conjugacy between the Bernoulli and the Beta distributions, i.e.,
fs|Nfs , Nes ∼ Beta
(
α+Nfs (t), β +N
e
s (t)−Nfs (t)
)
.
Finally, given a set of stories S, we denote the vector of posterior estimates of their associated rate of
misinformation as λˆm(t) = [λˆms (t)]s∈S .
2.5 The fact checking scheduling problem
Given a set of unverified stories S, we aim to find the optimal fact checking intensities u(t) that minimize the
expected value of nondecreasing convex loss function `(λˆm(t),u(t)) of the posterior estimates of the stories
rates of misinformation λˆm(t) and the fact checking intensities u(t) over a time window (t0, tf ], i.e.,
minimize
u(t0,tf ]
E
[
φ(λˆm(tf )) +
∫ tf
t0
l(λˆm(τ),u(τ))dτ
]
subject to u(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ (t0, tf ], (6)
where u(t0, tf ] denotes the fact checking intensities from t0 to tf , the expectation is taken over all possible
realizations of the marked temporal point processes associated to the endogenous and exogenous events of all
stories from t0 to tf , and φ(λˆm(tf )) is an arbitrary penalty function. Here, by considering a nondecreasing
loss on both the posterior estimate of the rates of misinformation and fact checking intensities, we penalize
high levels of misinformation and we limit the number of stories that are sent for fact checking.
3 Proposed algorithm
In this section, we find the optimal fact-checking intensities u(t) that minimizes Eq. 6 from the perspective
of stochastic optimal control of jump SDEs [17]. To ease the exposition, we first derive a solution for one
story, introduce an efficient algorithm that implements the solution, and then generalize the solution and the
efficient algorithm to multiple stories.
3.1 Optimizing for one story
Given an unverified story s with fact checking reviewing intensity us(t) = u(t), exogenous intensity λps(t) =
λp(t), endogenous intensity λes(t) = λe(t) and associated counting processes Ms(t) = M(t), Nps (t) = Np(t)
and Nes (t) = Ne(t), respectively, we can rewrite the fact checking scheduling problem defined in Eq. 6 as:
minimize
u(t0,tf ]
E
[
φ(λˆm(tf )) +
∫ tf
t0
l(λˆm(τ), u(τ))dτ
]
subject to u(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ (t0, tf ], (7)
where the dynamics of Ne(t) are given by Eq. 3 and the posterior estimate of the misinformation rate is given
by Eq. 5. Note that we are now focusing on a single story rather than on multiple stories.
Next, we define an optimal cost-to-go function J for the above problem, use Bellman’s principle of
optimality to derive the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation [3], and exploit the structure of
our problem to find a solution to the HJB equation.
6
Definition 2 The optimal cost-to-go J is defined as the minimum of the expected value of the cost of going
from state (M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), λe(t)) at time t to the final state at time tf , i.e.,
J(M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), λe(t), t) = min
u(t,tf ]
E
[
φ(λˆm(tf )) +
∫ tf
t
`(λˆm(τ), u(τ))dτ
]
.
Now, using the Markov property of the state variables (M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), λe(t)), we can apply
Bellman’s principle of optimality to the above definition to break the problem into smaller subproblems and
rewrite Eq. 8 as
0 = min
u(t,t+dt]
{
E
[
dJ(M(t), N(t), Nf (t), Np(t), λe(t), t)
]
+ `(λˆm(t), u(t))dt
}
. (8)
Next, we differentiate J with respect to time t, M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t) and λe(t) using Lemma 6 (in the
Appendix) with x(t) = λe(t), y(t) = λp(t) = h(t), z(t) = r(t), w(t) = f(t)) and F = J .
dJ =
[
J(M,Ne + 1, Nf + 1, Np, λe + γ, t)f(t)r(t) + J(M,Ne + 1, Nf + 1, Np, λe, t)f(t)(1− r(t))
+ J(M,Ne + 1, Nf , Np, λe + γ, t)(1− f(t))r(t) + J(M,Ne + 1, Nf , Np, λe, t)(1− f(t))(1− r(t))
− J(M,Ne, Nf , Np, λe, t)]dNe(t) + [J(M,Ne, Nf , Np + 1, λe + γ, t)
− J(M,Ne, Nf , Np, λe, t)]dNp(t)− [J(M,Ne, Nf , Np, λe, t)− J(M + 1, Ne, Nf , Np, 0, t)]dM(t)
+ Jt − ωλe(t)Jλe ,
Then, using that E[dNe(t)] = λe(t)dt, E[dNp(t)] = h(t)dt, E[dM(t)] = (1 −M(t))u(t)dt, E[r(t)] = rs = r,
and E[f(t)] = α+N
f (t)
α+β+Ne(t) , the HJB equation follows:
0 =
[
J(M,Ne + 1, Nf + 1, Np, λe + γ, t) α+N
f (t)
α+β+N(t)r + J(M,N
e + 1, Nf + 1, Np, λe, t) α+N
f (t)
α+β+N(t) (1− r)
+ J(M,Ne + 1, Nf , Np, λe + γ, t)(1− α+Nf (t)α+β+N(t) )r + J(M,Ne + 1, Nf , Np, λe, t)(1− α+N
f (t)
α+β+N(t) )(1− r)
− J(M,Ne, Nf , Np, λe, t)]λe(t) + [J(M,Ne, Nf , Np + 1, λe + γ, t)
− J(M,Ne, Nf , Np, λe, t)](1−M(t))h(t) + min
u(t,tf ]
{
l(λˆm(t), u(t)) + Jt − ωλe(t)Jλe
− [J(M,Ne, Nf , Np, λe, t)− J(M + 1, Ne, Nf , Np, 0, t)](1−M(t))u(t)}, (9)
with J(M(tf ), Ne(tf ), Nf (tf ), Np(tf ), λe(tf ), tf ) = φ(λˆe(tf )) as the terminal condition.
To solve the above HJB equation, we need to define the penalty function φ and the loss function `.
Following the literature on the stochastic optimal control [17], we consider the following quadratic forms,
which penalize high levels of misinformation and limit the number of stories that are sent for fact checking:
φ(λˆm(tf )) =
1
2
(λˆm(tf ))
2
`(λˆm(t), u(t)) =
1
2
(λˆm(t))2 +
1
2
qu2(t),
where q is a tunable parameter that accounts for the trade-off between the number of stories sent for fact
checking and the spread of misinformation in a social network. With the specified loss function, we take
the derivative with respect to u(t) in Eq. 9 and uncover the relationship between the optimal fact checking
intensity and the optimal cost J :
u∗(t) = q−1(1−M(t))[J(M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), λe(t), t)− J(M(t) + 1, Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), 0, t)]. (10)
Then, we plug in the above expression in Eq. 9 and find a solution to the resulting nonlinear differential
equation using the following Lemma:
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Lemma 3 The optimal cost-to-go J that satisfies the HJB equation, defined by Eq. 9, is given by:
J(M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), λe(t), t) = q
1
2
[
(pm|f=1 − pm|f=0) α+N
f (t)
α+β+N(t) + pm|f=0
][
λe(t)
− γNp(t)− (γr − ω)(α+ β +Ne(t))]. (11)
Proof Sketch. We verify the above cost-to-go J satisfies the HJB equation, given by Eq. 9. To do so, we use
that Jt = 0 and
Jλe = q
1
2
[
(pm|f=1 − pm|f=0) α+N
f (t)
α+β+N(t) + pm|f=0
]
.
Here, note that the HJB equation needs to be satisfied only for M(t) ∈ {0, 1}, which are the only feasible
values for the counting process associated to the fact checking event.
Next, we use the above Lemma to recover the optimal fact checking intensity u∗(t):
Theorem 4 Given a story s, the optimal fact checking intensity for the fact checking scheduling problem,
defined by Eq. 7, under quadratic loss is given by:
u∗(t) = q−
1
2 (1−M(t))
[
pm|f=0 + (pm|f=1 − pm|f=0)
(
α+Nf (t)
α+ β +Ne(t)
)]
λe(t). (12)
The above result reveals a linear relationship between the optimal fact checking intensity and the endogenous
(i.e., exposure) intensity λe(t). Moreover, the corresponding coefficient depends on the number of user
exposures Ne(t) and the number of flags Nf (t) and can increase and decrease over time. Remarkably, the
optimal intensity does not depend on the exogenous intensity λp(t), which is generally unknown.
Finally, we derive an efficient procedure to sample from the above intensity, summarized in Algorithm 1,
which we name Curb. Within the algorithm, Next() returns the next endogenous (i.e., exposure) event, which
occurs at time t′ with resharing and flagging indicators r and f , respectively, Update(Ne(t), Nf (t), λe(t))
updates u(t) using Eq. 12, and Sample(τ, u(t)) samples from an intensity u(t) starting at time τ using a
standard thinning algorithm [22]. If the fact checking intensity increases, by r = 1 or f = 1, we apply the
superposition theorem [19], i.e., we sample a new candidate fact checking time κ and we take the minimum
between κ and the previous candidate fact checking time. If the fact checking intensity decreases, by f = 0,
we first use a thinning argument to decide whether to keep the current candidate fact checking time τ or we
sample a new candidate fact checking time, greater than τ . This sampling procedure is very efficient since it
only needs to sample O(Ne(tf )) times from an inhomogeneous Poisson process. Finally, note that if we gather
more and more evidence that a story s is not misinformation (f = 0 for many exposures), the candidate fact
checking time τ will eventually become greater than tf and the story will never be sent for fact checking.
3.2 Optimizing for multiple stories
Given a set of unverified stories S with fact checking intensities u(t), exogenous intensities λp(t), endogenous
intensities λe(t) and associated counting processes M(t), Np(t) and N e(t), we can solve the fact checking
scheduling problem defined by Eq. 6 similarly as in the case of a single story. In particular, consider the
following quadratic form for the penalty function φ and loss function `:
`(λˆm(t),u(t)) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
(λˆms (t))
2 +
1
2
∑
s∈S
qsu
2
s(t),
where {qs}s∈S are given parameters, which trade off the number of stories sent for fact checking and the
spread of misinformation, and may favor fact checking some stories over others. Then, we can derive the
optimal control signal intensity for each story, using the independence assumption between stories, proceeding
similarly as in the case of a single story.
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Algorithm 1: The Curb Algorithm
Input: Parameters q, α, β, pm|f=1, pm|f=0, tf
Initialization :N(t)← 0; Nf (t)← 0; λe(t)← 0;
Update(Ne(t), Nf (t), λe(t))
Output: Fact checking time τ
τ ← tf
(t′, r, f)← Next()
while t′ < τ do
u0(t)← u(t)
Ne(t)← Ne(t) + 1; Nf (t)← Nf (t) + f
u(t)← Update(Ne(t), Nf (t), λe(t))
if f = 0 then
x← Uniform(0, 1)
if u(t)/u0(t) < x then
τ ← Sample(τ, u(t))
end
end
if r = 1 then
λe(t)← λe(t) + g(t− t′)
u(t)← Update(Ne(t), Nf (t), λe(t))
end
κ = Sample (t′,max(0, u(t)− u0(t)))
τ ← min(τ, κ)
(t′, r, f)← Next()
end
return τ
Theorem 5 Given a set of stories S, the optimal fact checking intensity for each story s ∈ S, which
minimizes Eq. 6, under quadratic loss and penalty functions is given by:
u∗s(t) = q
− 12
s (1−Ms(t))
[
pm|f=0 + (pm|f=1 − pm|f=0)
(
α+Nfs (t)
α+ β +Nes (t)
)]
λes(t). (13)
Finally, we can sample the fact checking times for all stories by running |S| instances of Curb, one per story,
and the overall number of required samples is O(
∑
s∈S N
e
s (tf )). Moreover, note that the instances can be
run in parallel and thus our algorithm is highly scalable.
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our algorithm on data gathered from two social networking sites, Twitter and
Weibo, and compare its performance with three baselines via two metrics.
4.1 Dataset description and experimental setup
We use data gathered from Twitter and Weibo as reported in previous work [21, 29], which comprises posts
and reshares for a variety of (manually annotated) genuine and fake stories11, respectively. More specifically,
the Twitter dataset contains 192,350 posts and reshares from 117,824 users for 111 unique stories. The Weibo
11In the Twitter and the Weibo datasets, stories were fact checked using snopes.com and the Sina community management center,
service.account.weibo.com.
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(a) Twitter (b) Weibo
Figure 1: Performance vs. number of fact checking events. We measure performance in terms of misinformation
reduction, which is the fraction of unverified exposures that fact checking prevented, and precision, which is
the fraction of fact checked stories that are fake. The oracle and Curb achieve a comparable performance in
both datasets, beating the threshold baseline by large margins.
dataset contains 3,752,459 posts and reshares from 2,819,338 users for 4,663 unique stories. We filtered out
stories posted or reshared more than 3,000 times as well as stories whose number of posts or reshares taking
place after the last decile of the observation period is greater than 1%. Finally, we filtered out fake stories at
random until the percentage of fake stories is less than 15%12.
After these preprocessing steps, our Twitter dataset consists of 28,486 posts and reshares from 18,880
users for 7 fake stories and 39 genuine stories and our Weibo dataset consists of 93,943 posts and reshares
from 88,913 users for 23 fake stories and 133 genuine stories. Unfortunately, the datasets do not contain any
information about the timing (or number) of exposures nor flags. To remedy the data unavailability, we
generate user exposures based on user reshares and sample flags from Bernoulli distributions. We experiment
with different parameter settings to ensure that our model’s efficacy is robust throughout different settings.
The details of the data generation steps are described in the following paragraph.
For each story, we sample exposure events using the exposure intensity defined by Eq. 2, which does
depend on the observed posts and reshares. There, we set γ = 10−4 and ω = 10−5. This choice of parameters
results in approximately 10 to 20 exposures per post (or reshare) and a half-life of approximately 19 hours
per post (or reshare). Under this setting, our Twitter and Weibo datasets contain 313,357 and 1,054,449
exposures respectively. Unless otherwise stated, for each exposure, we sample flags for fake and genuine
stories using two bernoulli distributions with pf=1|m=1 = 0.3 and pf=1|m=0 = 0.01, respectively. Moreover,
we estimate pd using the ratio between fake and overall number of stories, compute pm|f=1 and pm|f=0 from
pf=1|m, pf=0|m, and pd, and set α/(α+ β) = (pf=1|d + pf=0|d)pd. Finally, note that we obtained qualitatively
similar results for other experimental settings.
4.2 Evaluation metrics and baselines
Throughout this section, we evaluate the performance via two metrics: precision and misinformation reduction.
Precision is the fraction of fact checked stories that are fake. Misinformation reduction is the fraction of
unverified exposures that fact checking prevented.
We compare the performance of Curb against an “Oracle", which is a variant of Curb and has access to
the true flag probability pf , and three baselines. The first baseline (“Flag Ratio") samples the fact checking
time for each story using an intensity which is proportional to the ratio between the number of flags and
the total number of exposures, i.e., us(t) = qs(α+Nfs (t))/(α+ β +Nes (t)). The second baseline (“Flag
Sum") sends a story for fact checking as soon as it accumulates a certain number of flags. The third baseline
(“Exposure") samples the fact checking time for each story using an intensity which is proportional to the
exposure intensity, i.e., us(t) = qsλes(t). Here, note that the Flag Sum baseline utilizes a deterministic policy
while our method, the Oracle and the other baselines use a stochastic policy defined by an intensity function.
12We subsample the number of fake stories to resemble a more realistic scenario in which the number of fake stories is small in
comparison with the total number of stories. We obtained qualitatively similar results without subsampling.
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Figure 2: Misinformation reduction vs. time. For both (a) and (b), the bottom panel shows the number of
users exposed to misinformation at each time period, the middle panel shows when different methods send
stories for fact checking, and the top panel shows the cumulative number of users. The bars and lines show
the different fact checking schedules and "Total" which shows the numbers in absence of fact checking. Both
Curb and Oracle are able to prevent the spread of misinformation before it becomes viral, whereas the other
baselines cannot do so. The parameters for all methods are set so that the total number of fact-checked
stories is 15± 4 for Twitter and 64± 10 for Weibo.
4.3 Solution quality
We first evaluate the performance of our method, the oracle and the three baselines against the number of
fact checking events. Figure 1 summarizes the results, which show that: (i) the more the number of fact
checking events, the higher the average misinformation reduction for all methods; and, (ii) Oracle and Curb
achieve a comparable performance in both datasets, outperforming the baselines in most cases.
Next, we evaluate the performance in terms of misinformation reduction over time in Figure 2. We find
that both Curb and the Oracle are able to prevent the spread of misinformation before it becomes viral.
In contrast, the baselines are unable to spot misinformation that will become viral in time partly due to
ignoring either the flags or the exposure dynamics.
4.4 Flagging behavior and misinformation evidence
In this section, we first investigate how sensitive our algorithm is to the crowd’s flagging behavior and then
explore the influence of the hyperparameters α and β on the posterior estimate of the misinformation rate.
Intuitively, the more (less) accurate the crowd is at spotting misinformation, the more (less) effective our
algorithm will be. Figure 3 confirms this intuition by showing the performance of our algorithm for different
true positive rates, pf=1|m=1.
Next, we investigate the influence of the hyperparameter α on the posterior estimate of the misinformation
rate λms (t), which the optimal intensity u∗(t) depends on, and the posterior estimate of the flagging probability
E[fs|Nes (t), Nfs (t)] = fˆs by examining an example of a genuine and a fake story. Figure 4 summarizes the
results, which show that: (i) the higher the value of α, the smaller the effect of individual exposures and
flags on the posterior estimate of both the misinformation rate and the flagging probability when a story
starts spreading—the lower the variance of the estimates over time; and, (ii) the posterior estimate of the
misinformation rate, which the optimal intensity u∗(t) depend on, changes in a more intricate way than the
posterior estimate of the flagging probability since it combines the latter with the exposure intensity. This
enables our algorithm to be more cautious with viral stories even if the evidence of misinformation is weak.
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Figure 3: Performance for different true positive rates, pf=1|m=1. Here, we set the false positive rate to
pf=1|m=0 = 0.01. The higher the true positive rate, the better the crowd is at spotting misinformation and
the more effective Curb is. Total number of fact checked stories is 21± 2 for Twitter and 90± 15 for Weibo.
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Figure 4: Influence of the hyperparameter α on the posterior estimate of the misinformation rate, which the
optimal intensity u∗s(t) depends on, and the posterior estimate of the flagging probability. In the top and
middle panels, darker shades indicate stronger prior. The higher the value of α, the smaller the effect of
individual exposures and flags on the posterior estimate of both the misinformation rate and the flagging
probability.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced an efficient online algorithm, Curb, that leverages the crowd to detect
and prevent the spread of misinformation in online social networking sites. In doing so, we establish an
unexplored connection between stochastic online optimal control of stochastic differential equations (SDEs)
with jumps, survival analysis, and Bayesian inference. We experimented with two real-world datasets gathered
from Twitter and Weibo and showed that our algorithm may be able to effectively reduce the spread of
misinformation.
There are many interesting directions for future work. For example, we assumed every person in the
crowd is equally good (or bad) at flagging misinformation. It would be interesting to relax this assumption,
infer each person’s trustworthiness, and design algorithms that are robust to adversarial behavior from part
of the crowd. Moreover, we considered that stories are independent and the probability that a story is
misinformation given that a user did (not) flag a story is equal for all stories. However, stories may be
dependent and the probability that a story is misinformation given a user did (not) flag it may be different for
stories supported by different sources (or domains). Finally, our algorithm optimizes a quadratic loss of the
posterior estimate of the misinformation rate, however, it would be useful to derive fact checking intensities
for other losses capturing more nuanced goals.
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Appendix
Lemma 6 Let x(t) be a jump-diffusion process defined by the following SDE:
dx(t) = f(x(t), t)dt+ g(x(t), t)z(t)dNe(t) + h(x(t), t)(1−M(t))dNp(t) + k(x(t), t)dM(t),
where M(t), Ne(t), Np(t) are independent jump processes, Nf (t) is a jump process whose increment is defined
as dNf (t) = w(t)dNe(t), w(t) ∈ {0, 1}, and z(t) ∈ {0, 1}. If the function F (M(t), Ne(t), Nf (t), Np(t), x(t), t)
is once continuously differentiable in x(t) and t, then,
dF (M(t), N(t), Nf (t), Np(t), x(t), t)
=
[
F (M,Ne + 1, Nf + 1, Np, x+ g, t)w(t)z(t) + F (M,Ne + 1, Nf + 1, Np, x, t)w(t)(1− z(t))
+ F (M,Ne + 1, Nf , Np, x+ g, t)(1− w(t))(z(t)) + F (M,Ne + 1, Nf , Np, x, t)(1− w(t))(1− z(t))
−F (M,Ne, Nf , Np, x, t)] dNe(t) + [F (M,Ne, Nf , Np + 1, x+ h, t)
−F (M,Ne, Nf , Np, x, t)] dNp(t) + [F (M + 1, Ne, Nf , Np, x+ k, t)
−F (M,Ne, Nf , Np, x, t)] dM(t) + Ftdt+ fFxdt,
where for notational simplicity we dropped the arguments of the functions f, g, h, k.
Proof Sketch. The differential of J can be found using Ito’s calculus [17]. In particular, using that the bilinear
forms dtdNe(t) = dtdNp(t) = dtdM(t) = 0 and dNe(t)dM(t) = 0 and Np(t)dM(t) = 0 by the zero-one jump
law.
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